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Abstract 
Population ageing is, in the first instance, a demographic phenomenon, although its 
consequences go far beyond demography. But the future trends of ageing are not yet 
known and many of the consequences of ageing will depend on the future speed and 
extent of ageing. Here we summarize what is already known and what is not yet known 
about future ageing trends in different parts of the world. We do this through the means 
of new probabilistic population forecasts. Section 2 presents the results of those 
forecasts. They confirm our earlier finding that it is highly likely that the world’s 
population growth will come to the end during this century. The following four sections 
present results for proportions of populations 60+, old age dependency ratios, 
proportions 80+ and average ages. In Section 7, we analyse a new measure of ageing 
that takes life expectancy changes into account. 
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Global and Regional Population Ageing: How Certain Are We of 
its Dimensions? 
Wolfgang Lutz, Warren Sanderson, and Sergei Scherbov 
1.  Introduction 
Population ageing has become an important social, economic, health and even cultural 
topic because of the magnitudes of its effects and its pervasiveness. Specific 
combinations of declining fertility and mortality trends have resulted in an accelerating 
speed of population ageing in most societies including developing countries (Lutz et al. 
2008). Hence population ageing is in first instance a demographic phenomenon, 
although in its consequences it goes far beyond demography. But the future trends of 
ageing are not yet precisely known and many of the consequences of ageing will also 
depend on the future speed and extent of ageing. In this contribution we try to 
summarize what is already known and what is not yet known about future ageing trends 
in different parts of the world. We do this through the means of probabilistic 
demographic projections. 
Ageing, in most regions of the world, is caused mainly by changes in fertility 
and mortality rates, although in some regions migration also plays an important role. A 
powerful demographic regularity that we observe in many countries and in all regions of 
the world is the demographic transition (Notestein 1945; Kirk 1996). In the past, both 
fertility rates and mortality rates have been high. In most places, mortality rates begin to 
fall first, initiating a period of relatively rapid population growth. After a while, this 
mortality transition is followed by a fertility transition that brings fertility to a low level, 
usually below replacement. This pattern of demographic change is likely to run its 
course in all parts of the world well before the middle of the current century and will 
probably be replaced with dynamics that we can only dimly perceive today. 
In terms of mortality, life expectancies in today’s low mortality countries have 
been increasing at a fairly constant pace over the last 50 years (Oeppen and Vaupel 
2002; Bongaarts 2006). Life expectancies in some countries and regions have been 
catching up with the leaders (United Nations 2007). In others, they have been falling 
behind. We expect that this pattern of catching up and falling behind is likely to 
continue. This is one of the reasons for the uncertainty in the speed of ageing. 
In terms of fertility, the world today can be divided into three groups of 
countries, a few that have not yet fully entered the fertility transition, a group that are in 
the midst of their fertility transitions, and a group that are in their final (low fertility) 
phase. We expect that fertility transitions will continue to run their course, so that by 
mid-century it is likely that all regions of the world will be in the last phase of the 
transition. This provides another source of change in the drivers of ageing. There is still 
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likely to be a great deal of variability in the specific timing as well as in the fertility in 
the final stage of the transition, but the phase of general fertility decline is likely to be 
over almost everywhere by mid-century. This variability adds to the long term 
uncertainty about the magnitude of ageing. 
The ageing that we will see in most world regions in the early part of this 
century is driven by the forces of past life expectancy increases and catch-up and past 
reductions in fertility. In the longer-term, these forces will change and slowly these 
changes will be reflected in our measures of ageing. 
Uncertainty is a fundamental part of any demographic forecast. In 1981, Nathan 
Keyfitz, one of the giants of 20th century demography wrote: 
Demographers can no more be held responsible for inaccuracy in 
forecasting population 20 years ahead than geologists, meteorologists, or 
economists when they fail to announce earthquakes, cold winters, or 
depressions 20 years ahead. What we can be held responsible for is 
warning one another and our public what the error of our estimates is 
likely to be. (Keyfitz 1981: 579) 
In this paper, we follow Keyfitz’s invocation and provide new estimates of 
various measures of ageing along with assessments of their uncertainty. Section 2 of this 
paper presents the results of a new set of probabilistic world and regional population 
forecasts (Lutz et al. 2008). They confirm the finding that we presented earlier (Lutz et 
al. 2001a) that it is highly likely that the world’s population growth will come to the end 
during the 21st century. 
Section 3 presents our findings for the proportions of populations 60+ and in 
Section 4 we show the results for conventional old age dependency ratios. Figures for 
proportions 80+ are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 discusses ageing as viewed 
from the perspective of average ages. In Section 7, we present a new measure of ageing 
that takes changes in life expectancy into account. Section 8 contains our concluding 
thoughts. 
2.  New Regional and Global Probabilistic Population Forecasts 
Probabilistic population forecasts use random draws from distributions of total fertility 
rates, life expectancies at birth, and migration rates to produce distributions of 
population and age structure outcomes. The distributions of those figures come from 
information originally obtained from experts and updated according to the most recent 
observations (Lutz et al. 2001a, 2004, 2008). They utilize time series statistical 
techniques and have been evaluated to ensure that they are consistent with magnitudes 
to be expected from the ex post analysis of errors in past United Nations (UN) forecasts. 
The assumptions underlying the forecasts were originally set out in Lutz et al. (2001a) 
and justified in some detail in Lutz et al. (2004). They have been updated in Lutz et al. 
(2008). A brief statement of them appears in the Appendix. 
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Our probabilistic forecasts begin with the age and gender structure of regional 
populations in 2000.1 The 13 regions are North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, North 
America, Latin America, Central Asia, Middle East, South Asia, China Region, Pacific 
Asia, Japan/Oceania, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the European portion of the 
former Soviet Union (FSU). A listing of the countries included in each region can be 
found in Lutz et al. (2004: 63-66). The first step in making a forecast for 2001 is to draw 
random total fertility rates, random life expectancies at birth, and random migration 
rates for each of our 13 regions. Fertility and mortality rates are assumed to be 
correlated across regions. Fertility and mortality rates are assumed not to be correlated 
with one another within regions, but current fertility rates and current mortality rates in 
each region are correlated with past values of their own series. Age-specific birth rates 
are assumed to follow standard patterns given the assumed level of total fertility rates. 
Similarly, age-specific survival rates are derived from the life expectancies at birth, and 
age-specific migration rates are derived from the random number of migrants. With 
these age-specific rates and the age structure in the initial year, we can forecast the 
population from the base year 2000 to the first projection year 2001. We repeat this 
process through 2100, keeping track of the contemporaneous interregional correlations 
and the correlations of fertility and mortality rates with their past values. This gives us 
one complete path of population and age structures. When we duplicate this process one 
thousand times, we obtain distributions of the demographic measures of interest. 
Probabilistic population forecasts which consider the uncertainty in all three 
components of population change (fertility, mortality and migration) have a number of 
advantages over the presentation of a small set of variants, such as those provided by the 
United Nations Population Division (for example, United Nations 2008) especially 
when it comes to the study of ageing. The UN low, medium, and high variants differ 
only in terms of fertility. Because they do not reflect alternative mortality assumptions, 
the variants are not suitable for the study of the uncertainty in the patterns of ageing, 
where mortality variability is an important part of the explanation. In addition, the UN 
variants assume a perfect correlation in fertility rates across countries. In the UN low 
variant, for example, all countries in the world have relatively low fertility. If Germany 
has comparatively low fertility, so will Gabon. There is no possibility that low fertility 
in one region can ever be compensated by high fertility in another. 
Figure 1 shows the time paths of world population size in nine of the thousand 
simulated futures that we have generated. They have been chosen so that each one has 
in 2100 a world population size corresponding to one of the deciles of the distribution of 
world population sizes in that year. It is clear from that Figure that world population 
sizes can go up and go down. Our simulated population paths allow there to be future 
baby booms and busts. They allow for the possibility of substantial increases in human 
life expectancy as well as the possibility of significant decreases in life expectancy, 
which could possibly be caused by environmental disasters or epidemics. 
                                                 
1
 For most regions, we used observed fertility, mortality, and migration data for the period 2000 to 2006. 
However, in the China Region, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia fertility was uncertain even in 2000 
(see Appendix). 
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Figure 1.  Nine simulated paths of world population. Note: These paths were chosen out 
of our 1,000 simulated futures so that each one ends at one of the deciles of the 
distribution of world population sizes in 2100. 
 
Figure 2 shows the famous graph of global human population sizes from the 
year 1000 onward. For most of the span in that graph, the human population grew 
slowly. Around 1800, the population growth rate increased due to declining mortality 
and reached a peak in the 1950s. What is not so often seen is the feathered part of the 
graph on the right indicating the uncertainty of world population sizes in the current 
century. Clearly, it is likely that the world’s population growth will come to an end 
during this century. The ending of world population growth has implications for ageing, 
which we will discuss in the following sections. The main reason that world population 
growth is likely to come to an end this century is that most countries of the world will 
eventually reach the final stage of the demographic transition where fertility will 
probability be below the replacement level. Eventually, below replacement fertility will 
result in falling populations in most regions of the world by the end of the century, once 
population momentum is exhausted. 
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Figure 2.  Estimated world population size from 1000 to 2000. Distribution of 
forecasted world population sizes 2001 to 2100. Source: Estimates for the years 1000 to 
2000 from United Nations (1999). 
 
In Figure 3, we show the probability that a peak will be reached in global and 
regional populations by year from 2000 to 2100. Eastern Europe and the European part 
of the Former Soviet Union are already on a declining trajectory and have with great 
probability already surpassed its peak. The curve for Japan/Oceania rises quickly and 
shows that by 2010 there is over a 40 percent chance that the peak population of that 
region will already be reached. By 2025 that probability rises to almost 70 percent. The 
China Region initially has a lower probability of peaking, but that probability rises over 
time, so it also becomes almost 70 percent in 2025. There is a 90 percent chance that the 
population of the China Region will have reached its peak some time before 2040. 
At the other extreme, the chance that Sub-Saharan Africa will have reached its 
population peak by 2050 is virtually zero. That probability rises slowly at first after 
2050, but then with increasing speed, so that by 2100 it increases to around 64 percent. 
This figure is marginally lower than that for Latin America, where the probability of 
peaking increases almost linearly from 2060 onward. 
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Figure 3.  Probability that global and regional populations will reach a peak by the 
indicated date. 
 
Over the course of this century, demographic conditions will become ever more 
polarized. Figure 4a shows the forecasted distribution of the population of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Figure 4b shows it for Eastern Europe. According to the mean outcomes, we 
expect that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will more than triple in this century, 
while the population of Eastern Europe is anticipated to fall by over one-half. These 
enormous differences in rates of population growth will also be reflected in the patterns 
of population ageing. 
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Figure 4a.  Distribution of forecasted populations of Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000 to 2100. 
 
 
Figure 4b.  Distribution of forecasted populations of Eastern Europe, 2000 to 2100. 
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Table 1 shows the mean population sizes and 80 percent confidence intervals for 
the world and 13 major regions based on our 1,000 simulated population futures. We 
present the results for 2000 (based on observations), 2010, 2025, 2050, 2075, and 2100. 
All the detailed data underlying this and other Tables and Figures in the paper are 
available from the authors upon request. 
World population was around 6.1 billion people in 2000. Using the mean 
forecast, we anticipate it to rise to around 7.8 billion in 2025. After that we expect the 
world’s population to rise by around 1 billion people to 2050 and then by another billion 
by 2075. This would be the last billion people to be added to the world’s population. By 
2100, our mean forecasts show a world with about 400 million fewer people than it had 
a quarter of a century earlier. Of course, we do not think that the path of world’s 
population is likely to follow the means of our distributions. It is quite possible that the 
last billion people will be added earlier or later. 
In 2000, the China Region had the largest population size among all the regions 
in the Table with around 1.41 billion people. The mean of our forecast for the China 
Region falls to 1.34 billion in 2050 and then plummets to 0.85 billion in 2100. The next 
largest region in the Table in 2000 is South Asia with a population of 1.37 billion. The 
mean forecast for it in 2050 is 1.61 billion, making it the region with the largest 
population at that time. The population there is expected to continue to grow in the 
second half of the century, reaching a mean forecasted value of 2.12 billion. However, 
neither the China Region nor South Asia is expected to have the largest population in 
2100 according to the average of our forecasts. That distinction falls to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which started the century with a population of 0.61 billion. The mean forecast 
for that region rises stunningly to 1.61 billion in 2050 and then to 2.12 billion in 2100. 
According to the mean forecast, around half of the population of the world in 2100 will 
be living either in Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. Of course, as indicated by our 80 
percent confidence intervals, there is substantial uncertainty associated with all of these 
forecasts. 
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Table 1. Probabilistic forecasts of global and regional population sizes. The main 
figures in the Table are means of 1,000 simulated futures. The figures in parentheses are 
80 percent prediction intervals. Population sizes are in millions, except for South Asia, 
China Region, and the World, where they are in billions. 
 2000 2010 2025 2050 2075 2100 
North Africa 173.3 207.6 253.5 305.8 328.3 330.5 
 (173.3-173.3) (205.3-210.1) (238.1-268.2) (267.3-346.2) (261.1-399.7) (236.4-432.9) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa 611.2 799.0 1086.2 1608.2 2011.7 2119.2 
 (611.2-611.2) (781.3-815.5) (1000.6-1168.2) (1337.2-1892.7) (1485.5-2531.3) (1386.1-2874.3) 
       
North America 313.7 338.5 380.2 426.6 449.3 464.5 
 (313.7-313.7) (332-345) (358.8-402.3) (372.8-484) (362.2-538.5) (336.8-598.5) 
 0.000 0.015 0.045 0.100 0.156 0.214 
       
Latin America 515.3 595.3 703.4 833.0 903.2 947.5 
 (515.3-515.3) (589.9-600.8) (669.2-738.9) (734.3-933.2) (719.7-1094.9) (672.7-1228.5) 
       
Central Asia 55.9 65.3 79.2 95.8 102.9 102.9 
 (55.9-55.9) (64.7-65.8) (75.1-83.5) (84-107.6) (81.6-124.8) (72.3-133.1) 
       
Middle East 172.1 214.4 277.4 357.0 394.5 396.4 
 (172.1-172.1) (212.2-216.7) (260.8-294.6) (314.4-402.2) (314.6-473.8) (291.2-509.7) 
 0.000 0.008 0.048 0.096 0.158 0.221 
       
South Asia 1.367 1.625 1.957 2.285 2.290 2.041 
 (1.367-1.367) (1.601-1.651) (1.837-2.078) (1.983-2.603) (1.77-2.832) (1.385-2.709) 
       
China Region 1.408 1.467 1.506 1.342 1.064 0.853 
 (1.408-1.408) (1.445-1.489) (1.442-1.566) (1.177-1.519) (0.81-1.332) (0.575-1.182) 
       
Pacific Asia 476.4 541.7 622.6 699.2 699.9 657.8 
 (476.4-476.4) (537.3-546) (593.9-651.7) (619.5-786.7) (562.1-841.4) (477.8-869.4) 
       
Japan/Oceania 149.9 151.5 149.2 136.0 115.6 99.2 
 (149.9-149.9) (150.3-152.9) (142.6-155.8) (118.3-154.6) (88.9-143.8) (68.3-130.2) 
       
Western Europe 455.6 462.2 467.4 447.6 395.7 353.4 
 (455.6-455.6) (458.3-466) (448-487.6) (391.9-507.9) (311.3-489.3) (246.9-462.2) 
       
Eastern Europe 121.2 119.5 112.9 93.9 72.3 57.9 
 (121.2-121.2) (118.7-120.3) (108.3-117.6) (81.9-106.7) (54.5-92.4) (37.4-78.5) 
       
European FSU 235.6 227.6 210.0 169.3 130.2 109.1 
 (235.6-235.6) (226.1-228.9) (201.6-218.2) (146.6-192) (96.9-165.8) (68.1-149.5) 
       
World 6.055 6.815 7.805 8.800 8.958 8.533 
 (6.055-6.055) (6.745-6.883) (7.442-8.164) (7.783-9.903) (7.146-10.799) (6.161-11.05) 
 
 10
3.  Proportions of the Population 60+ Years Old 
Table 2 shows the data for proportions of the population who are 60 years old or older. 
It shows that increases in this measure will almost certainly be observed in every region 
of the world between 2000 and 2050. The lower bounds of the 80 percent confidence 
intervals in 2050 are well above the levels of the corresponding proportions in 2000. 
Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as being a bit different from the other regions in this 
regard. In that region 4.6 percent of the population was 60+ in 2000. In 2050, the lower 
bound of the 80 percent confidence interval is 5.5 percent. This is still above 4.6 
percent, but it suggests that there is a small possibility that very little ageing would 
occur there. 
The Japan/Oceania region leads the world in the proportion of 60+ year olds. In 
2000, 22.0 percent of that region’s population was that old. The mean of our forecasts 
for 2025 is 33.0 percent. It is 42.4 percent in 2050 and over one half by the end of the 
century. It is quite striking that we expect a region to have a majority of its population 
over age 60 by 2100. Japan is older than Australia and New Zealand, the other two 
countries in that region. Therefore, in Japan we would expect that proportion to be even 
higher. This may lead not only to socio-economics consequences, but to political ones 
as well (Sanderson and Scherbov 2007). 
The uncertainties associated with forecasts of the year 2100 are, naturally, very 
large. In the case of the Japan/Oceania region the 80 percent confidence interval in 2100 
ranges from 37.4 percent to 62.3 percent. Since the mean forecast for 2050 was 42.4 
percent, there is a possibility that the Japan/Oceania region would experience little or no 
increase in the proportion 60+ during the last half of the century. On the other hand, 
there is a ten percent chance that the proportion of the 60+ year old population will 
exceed 62.3 percent. 
In most regions of the world, we see a slower increase in the proportion of the 
60+ population in the second half of the century than the first. A striking example of 
this is the European portion of the former Soviet Union. There, the proportion of the 
60+ population increases from 18.7 percent in 2000 to an average forecast of 40.1 
percent in 2050. This indicates quite rapid ageing. After 2050, however, the story is 
quite different. The mean forecasted proportion 60+ rises marginally to 41.2 percent in 
2070, and then falls to 39.1 percent in 2100. This phenomenon is due to two factors. 
The first is the very low fertility in that region in the recent past and its likely 
continuation in the near-term future. The second is our assumption that on average 
fertility levels will increase in this region to a level of some Western European countries 
today. There is quite a bit of uncertainty in these numbers, but they do suggest that the 
experience of population ageing will be substantially different before and after mid-
century. A similar pattern in the speed of population ageing can be seen in Eastern 
Europe. 
The Middle East is a region where we see rapid increases in the proportion 60+ 
happening throughout the century. Only 5.6 percent of the people there were 60+ years 
old in 2000. The mean of our forecasts increases to 18.6 percent in 2050 and then 
continues around the same pace of increase, reaching 34.6 percent in 2100. This is only 
4.2 percentage points lower than the figure for North America at that date. The six-fold 
increase in the proportion of the people in the population who are 60+ years old during 
the century is one of the most striking examples of ageing that we see in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Probabilistic forecasts of global and regional proportions of populations 60+ 
years old. The main figures in the Table are means of 1,000 simulated futures. The 
figures in parentheses are 80 percent prediction intervals. 
 2000 2010 2025 2050 2075 2100 
North Africa 0.061 0.068 0.104 0.193 0.274 0.320 
 (0.061-0.061) (0.067-0.069) (0.096-0.111) (0.164-0.224) (0.217-0.339) (0.241-0.416) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.046 0.044 0.048 0.066 0.134 0.202 
 (0.046-0.046) (0.043-0.045) (0.044-0.051) (0.055-0.078) (0.105-0.166) (0.16-0.253) 
       
North America 0.164 0.181 0.254 0.294 0.346 0.388 
 (0.164-0.164) (0.178-0.184) (0.236-0.272) (0.239-0.346) (0.264-0.424) (0.284-0.487) 
       
Latin America 0.079 0.089 0.132 0.223 0.283 0.323 
 (0.079-0.079) (0.088-0.09) (0.124-0.141) (0.187-0.264) (0.218-0.354) (0.231-0.42) 
       
Central Asia 0.083 0.076 0.120 0.204 0.279 0.335 
 (0.083-0.083) (0.076-0.077) (0.112-0.128) (0.171-0.238) (0.215-0.349) (0.247-0.43) 
       
Middle East 0.056 0.060 0.090 0.186 0.285 0.346 
 (0.056-0.056) (0.059-0.06) (0.083-0.097) (0.156-0.219) (0.222-0.351) (0.253-0.437) 
       
South Asia 0.070 0.076 0.104 0.176 0.271 0.352 
 (0.07-0.07) (0.075-0.077) (0.096-0.111) (0.148-0.206) (0.216-0.334) (0.268-0.443) 
       
China Region 0.099 0.121 0.200 0.356 0.416 0.427 
 (0.099-0.099) (0.119-0.123) (0.189-0.212) (0.303-0.414) (0.316-0.519) (0.308-0.554) 
       
Pacific Asia 0.076 0.089 0.137 0.230 0.291 0.358 
 (0.076-0.076) (0.088-0.09) (0.129-0.145) (0.194-0.266) (0.227-0.36) (0.266-0.456) 
       
Japan/Oceania 0.220 0.275 0.330 0.424 0.464 0.505 
 (0.22-0.22) (0.272-0.277) (0.308-0.351) (0.358-0.489) (0.36-0.568) (0.374-0.623) 
       
Western Europe 0.199 0.214 0.279 0.372 0.416 0.455 
 (0.199-0.199) (0.212-0.216) (0.261-0.297) (0.314-0.435) (0.316-0.512) (0.337-0.572) 
       
Eastern Europe 0.177 0.200 0.272 0.416 0.447 0.447 
 (0.177-0.177) (0.199-0.202) (0.256-0.289) (0.357-0.477) (0.339-0.56) (0.32-0.58) 
 0.000 0.006 0.046 0.113 0.194 0.220 
       
European FSU 0.187 0.190 0.272 0.401 0.412 0.391 
 (0.187-0.187) (0.189-0.191) (0.258-0.286) (0.343-0.458) (0.308-0.517) (0.282-0.513) 
       
World 0.100 0.108 0.149 0.220 0.277 0.327 
 (0.1-0.1) (0.107-0.109) (0.14-0.157) (0.188-0.256) (0.218-0.34) (0.251-0.409) 
 
 12
Figure 5 shows the fraction of our 1,000 simulated futures in which the 
proportion of the population 60+ years old exceeds one-third for selected regions. There 
are a number of distinct clusters in the Figure. To the left are the regions where high 
proportions 60+ come early. This cluster is bounded by the Japan/Oceania region where 
the one-third level is reached earliest in the China Region. Another cluster of regions 
where the one-third level will come considerably later in the century include Pacific 
Asia, Latin America, and South Asia (not all shown in the graph). In between, North 
America stands out as having a unique temporal path of ageing. Sub-Saharan Africa 
(not shown in the graph) also stands out as being unique. The proportion of paths on 
which the fraction of 60+ year olds exceeds one-third barely rises above zero by the end 
of the century. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Percent of 1,000 simulated futures in which the proportion of the population 
60+ exceeds one-third by the indicated date. 
4.  Old Age Dependency Ratios 
The old age dependency ratio (OADR) here is defined as the ratio of the population 60+ 
years old to the population 20 to 59 years old. This ratio was named many years ago, 
but now the word “dependency” has become quite anachronistic. Many 60+ year olds 
should not be considered dependent. Nevertheless, the ratio provides us with an 
interesting measure of age structure that can be used in studies of population ageing. 
Again we see from Table 3 that the Japan/Oceania region is the oldest. The 
OADR was 0.392 in 2000. By 2010, it will rise by over 0.12 to 0.518. In 2010, for every 
100 Japanese in the age group 20 to 59, we would expect there to be nearly 52 Japanese 
60+. The rapid rise in the OADR continues after that. By 2050, for every 100 Japanese 
20 to 59 years old, we expect there to be around 101 who are 60+. By 2100, the average 
forecast is that there would be around 151 Japanese 60+ for every 100 who are 20 to 59. 
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Table 3.  Probabilistic forecasts of global and regional Old Age Dependency Ratios 
(population 60+/population 20 to 59). The main figures in the Table are means of 1,000 
simulated futures. The figures in parentheses are 80 percent prediction intervals. 
 2000 2010 2025 2050 2075 2100 
North Africa 0.130 0.132 0.192 0.362 0.566 0.708 
 (0.13-0.13) (0.132-0.133) (0.184-0.201) (0.302-0.425) (0.414-0.745) (0.457-1.021) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.116 0.112 0.111 0.127 0.249 0.376 
 (0.116-0.116) (0.112-0.113) (0.109-0.112) (0.112-0.144) (0.196-0.309) (0.285-0.487) 
       
North America 0.297 0.327 0.505 0.615 0.796 0.980 
 (0.297-0.297) (0.321-0.333) (0.464-0.549) (0.471-0.764) (0.531-1.066) (0.586-1.381) 
       
Latin America 0.156 0.166 0.243 0.438 0.604 0.733 
 (0.156-0.156) (0.165-0.167) (0.231-0.256) (0.355-0.532) (0.423-0.812) (0.451-1.067) 
       
Central Asia 0.178 0.144 0.224 0.388 0.576 0.746 
 (0.178-0.178) (0.144-0.145) (0.214-0.234) (0.32-0.462) (0.409-0.772) (0.473-1.072) 
       
Middle East 0.126 0.120 0.169 0.347 0.591 0.783 
 (0.127-0.127) (0.12-0.121) (0.161-0.178) (0.287-0.413) (0.417-0.785) (0.494-1.107) 
       
South Asia 0.146 0.150 0.192 0.317 0.526 0.755 
 (0.146-0.146) (0.15-0.151) (0.185-0.2) (0.263-0.376) (0.389-0.689) (0.498-1.068) 
       
China Region 0.175 0.196 0.337 0.741 1.016 1.114 
 (0.175-0.175) (0.195-0.197) (0.32-0.356) (0.588-0.915) (0.633-1.445) (0.624-1.708) 
       
Pacific Asia 0.144 0.160 0.246 0.445 0.596 0.799 
 (0.144-0.144) (0.159-0.161) (0.235-0.259) (0.367-0.531) (0.423-0.794) (0.5-1.166) 
       
Japan/Oceania 0.392 0.518 0.656 1.013 1.246 1.511 
 (0.392-0.392) (0.513-0.524) (0.601-0.712) (0.776-1.268) (0.785-1.786) (0.836-2.285) 
       
Western Europe 0.360 0.384 0.530 0.826 1.031 1.245 
 (0.36-0.36) (0.38-0.387) (0.492-0.57) (0.636-1.046) (0.651-1.449) (0.723-1.854) 
       
Eastern Europe 0.316 0.340 0.494 0.967 1.173 1.214 
 (0.316-0.316) (0.338-0.343) (0.464-0.527) (0.761-1.193) (0.706-1.73) (0.675-1.887) 
       
European FSU 0.342 0.314 0.494 0.913 1.032 0.986 
 (0.342-0.342) (0.312-0.316) (0.47-0.522) (0.73-1.112) (0.637-1.47) (0.57-1.528) 
       
World 0.196 0.203 0.278 0.428 0.570 0.710 
 (0.196-0.196) (0.202-0.204) (0.266-0.293) (0.356-0.506) (0.414-0.743) (0.482-0.985) 
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The uncertainty associated with the figures in 2100 is, as usual, quite large. The 
80 percent confidence interval spans the range from 0.836 to 2.285. The 0.836 figure is 
well below the average forecast for 2050. The 2.285 is remarkably high – around 228 
people 60+ for each 100 who were 20 to 59. Rapid ageing is clearly indicated for the 
Japan/Oceania region from 2000 to 2050. Even taking account of the uncertainties in 
our computations there can be little doubt about this. The period after 2050 is murkier. 
It is likely that the OADR will increase, but that is no longer certain. 
The China Region is also ageing quite rapidly. The OADR there was 0.175 in 
2000 and is expected to rise only modestly to 0.196 in 2010. Between 2010 and 2050, 
the average forecast shows a jump to 0.741. The 80 percent confidence interval is 
between 0.588 and 0.915, so we are confident that the figure in 2050 will be 
significantly above the one in 2010. The OADR in the China Region in 2050 is 
confidently expected to be higher than the OADR in any world region in Table 3 today. 
The OADR in the China Region is expected to continue to rise rapidly to 2100. Again, 
however, the uncertainty dilutes what we can confidently predict. The average OADR 
forecast for the China Region in 2100 is 111 people 60+ for each 100 people 20 to 59. 
The 80 percent confidence interval around that figure is large, from 62 people to 171 
people 60+ per 100 people 20 to 59. It is possible therefore that the OADR does not 
increase between 2050 and 2100 or that it skyrockets. 
In many other regions of the world, we are reasonably confident that the OADR 
will continue to increase throughout the century. Central Asia is one such place. Its 
OADR was 0.178 in 2000 and was expected to fall to 0.144 in 2010. After that it starts 
to increase rapidly to 0.388 in 2050 and then to 0.746 in 2100. The 80 percent 
confidence interval in 2050 is between 0.320 and 0.462. The 80 percent confidence 
interval in 2100 is 0.473 to 1.072. Despite the large uncertainty around our forecast for 
2100, it is still extremely unlikely that Central Asia would experience a decrease in its 
OADR between 2050 and 2100. North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East 
are also regions where even the large uncertainties associated with what might happen 
in the second half of the century are not large enough to make us doubt the increases in 
OADRs there. 
5.  Proportions of the Population 80+ 
According to the figures in Table 4, about one percent of the world’s population was 
80+ years old in 2000. The mean forecast is for this figure to rise to 4 percent in 2050 
and to 11 percent in 2100. For most of the regions the period 2025 to 2050 is the one in 
which the increase in the proportion is the fastest. In 2050, the countries cluster into 
four groups, those with proportions of the population 80+ of 4 percent or less (North 
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, 
and Pacific Asia), those with proportions around 8 percent (the China Region and 
European FSU), and those around 10 percent or higher (Eastern Europe, Western 
Europe, Japan/Oceania, and North America). By 2100, the average forecast shows that 
in the Japan/Oceania region around 27 percent of the population would be 80+ years 
old. This figure is very imprecise, with the 80 percent confidence interval ranging from 
a modest 11 percent to an enormous 42 percent. 
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Table 4.  Probabilistic forecasts of global and regional proportions of populations 80+ 
years old. The main figures in the Table are means of 1,000 simulated futures. The 
figures in parentheses are 80 percent prediction intervals. 
 2000 2010 2025 2050 2075 2100 
North Africa 0.005 0.0061 0.008 0.026 0.061 0.106 
 (0.005-0.005) (0.0061-0.0062) (0.007-0.009) (0.018-0.036) (0.03-0.102) (0.043-0.195) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.003 0.0029 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.030 
 (0.003-0.003) (0.0028-0.0029) (0.003-0.003) (0.004-0.006) (0.007-0.015) (0.015-0.054) 
       
North America 0.032 0.0297 0.038 0.091 0.129 0.180 
 (0.032-0.032) (0.029-0.0304) (0.031-0.045) (0.051-0.136) (0.057-0.205) (0.068-0.294) 
       
Latin America 0.009 0.0096 0.013 0.040 0.078 0.117 
 (0.009-0.009) (0.0095-0.0097) (0.012-0.015) (0.025-0.06) (0.035-0.132) (0.043-0.214) 
       
Central Asia 0.008 0.0099 0.010 0.031 0.071 0.116 
 (0.008-0.008) (0.0098-0.0101) (0.009-0.011) (0.02-0.046) (0.034-0.121) (0.046-0.206) 
       
Middle East 0.005 0.0059 0.008 0.026 0.070 0.126 
 (0.005-0.005) (0.0058-0.0059) (0.007-0.009) (0.016-0.038) (0.032-0.12) (0.049-0.224) 
       
South Asia 0.006 0.0066 0.009 0.021 0.050 0.100 
 (0.006-0.006) (0.0065-0.0067) (0.008-0.01) (0.015-0.029) (0.026-0.082) (0.042-0.183) 
       
China Region 0.009 0.0130 0.019 0.077 0.143 0.181 
 (0.009-0.009) (0.0128-0.0132) (0.017-0.022) (0.051-0.109) (0.069-0.237) (0.071-0.325) 
       
Pacific Asia 0.006 0.0081 0.013 0.038 0.072 0.119 
 (0.006-0.006) (0.008-0.0082) (0.011-0.014) (0.026-0.054) (0.035-0.124) (0.046-0.22) 
       
Japan/Oceania 0.035 0.0460 0.078 0.144 0.208 0.268 
 (0.035-0.035) (0.0451-0.0469) (0.064-0.093) (0.084-0.212) (0.094-0.335) (0.111-0.422) 
       
Western Europe 0.033 0.0368 0.049 0.116 0.167 0.221 
 (0.033-0.033) (0.0362-0.0375) (0.041-0.058) (0.069-0.174) (0.075-0.268) (0.088-0.366) 
 0.000 0.013 0.141 0.339 0.453 0.470 
       
Eastern Europe 0.019 0.0307 0.040 0.097 0.181 0.205 
 (0.019-0.019) (0.0303-0.0311) (0.034-0.046) (0.061-0.14) (0.086-0.296) (0.081-0.356) 
       
European FSU 0.020 0.031 0.034 0.084 0.152 0.162 
 (0.02-0.02) (0.0303-0.0309) (0.03-0.038) (0.055-0.122) (0.072-0.247) (0.063-0.292) 
       
World 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.042 0.072 0.109 
 (0.011-0.011) (0.013-0.0134) (0.015-0.019) (0.028-0.06) (0.036-0.116) (0.048-0.19) 
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The large uncertainties associated with the proportions 80+ are a reflection of 
the inclusion of mortality uncertainty in our probabilistic forecasts. It is impossible to 
make sensible forecasts of the likely paths of ageing without it. We demonstrate this in 
Figure 6, where we show the predicted distribution of the proportions 80+ for Western 
Europe from 2000 to 2050. On the right-hand side of the graph, we mark the 
proportions in 2050 derived from the UN low and high variants. The low (high) variant 
produces a higher (lower) proportion 80+ because it assumes lower (higher) fertility. 
The difference between the proportions 80+ based on the low and high variants are 
much smaller than one would expect from our predicted distribution because our 
forecasts incorporate mortality uncertainty. Our mean proportion 80+ is higher than the 
UN’s because by the end of the century, our fertility forecasts are generally lower than 
the UN’s and our life expectancies at birth are generally higher. 
Even with the substantial uncertainty around the proportions 80+, we can still 
use them. In most of the world’s regions, those proportions will, with quite high 
probabilities, rise from 2010 to 2025 and then again to 2050. After 2050, the ratios are 
still likely to rise, but the large uncertainties preclude us from making a definite 
statement that they will. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Forecasted distribution of the proportion of the population 80+ years old in 
Western Europe, 2000 to 2100. 
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6.  Average Ages 
Table 5 presents information on average ages. The average age of a person on Earth in 
2000 was 29.7. Using the means of our forecasts, we expect that average to increase to 
31.3 in 2010, to 34.3 in 2025, to 38.8 in 2050, and to 46.0 in 2100. The increase in 
average age over the century is around 16 years, and therefore the mean speed of 
increase is 1.6 years per decade. According to the mean forecast, we would not expect 
the speed to change much as the century progresses. The UN forecasts world life 
expectancy at birth to increase from 66.5 in 2005-10 to 75.1 in 2045-50, or at a rate of 
2.15 years per decade. Therefore, average age is likely to be increasing more slowly 
than life expectancy. Average ages are slightly higher than median ages. As age 
structures become more symmetric over time, median ages converge to average ages. 
For the world, the difference between our average age and the UN median age in 2025 
is 1.4 years. In 2050, the difference shrinks to 1.0 years. 
An interesting comparison in the Table is between North America and European 
FSU. In 2000 and in 2100 their average ages are similar, but their paths of ageing are 
quite different. In the first half of the century, ageing is considerably more rapid in 
European FSU. In 2050, the means of the average age distributions differ by 5.6 years. 
After 2050, ageing in European FSU essentially comes to a halt. The average ages in 
2050 and 2100 are virtually the same, and are indistinguishable once uncertainty is 
taken into account. In North America, there is no ageing hiatus. The average age is 
likely to increase throughout the second half of the century, eventually catching up to 
the European FSU region by 2100. 
Currently, the area with the fastest increase in average age is the China Region. 
There the average age is expected to increase from 31.2 in 2000 to around 40.5 in 2025. 
The slowest increase is in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average age is hardly expected 
to increase at all from 2000 to 2025. Over the entire century, the region with the largest 
increase in average age is the Middle East where the increase is 22.8 years. 
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Table 5.  Probabilistic forecasts of global and regional average ages of the population. 
The main figures in the Table are means of 1,000 simulated futures. The figures in 
parentheses are 80 percent prediction intervals. 
 2000 2010 2025 2050 2075 2100 
North Africa 25.5 27.3 31.1 37.5 42.1 45.2 
 (25.5-25.5) (27.1-27.6) (29.8-32.4) (35.2-39.8) (38.8-45.7) (40.3-51) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.1 21.6 22.9 27.4 33.0 38.3 
 (22.1-22.1) (21.2-22) (21.9-24) (25.5-29.7) (30.6-35.7) (35.4-41.7) 
       
North America 36.5 37.7 40.4 43.6 46.5 49.6 
 (36.5-36.5) (37.4-38.1) (39-41.7) (40.1-47) (41.4-51.6) (42.2-57.1) 
       
Latin America 27.8 29.8 33.5 39.0 42.5 45.2 
 (27.8-27.8) (29.6-30) (32.3-34.7) (36.4-41.9) (38.5-46.8) (39.6-51.7) 
       
Central Asia 26.9 28.7 32.0 37.9 42.5 46.3 
 (26.9-26.9) (28.5-28.9) (30.8-33.3) (35.5-40.5) (38.8-46.8) (40.9-52.1) 
       
Middle East 24.2 26.0 29.8 37.1 42.9 47.0 
 (24.2-24.2) (25.8-26.3) (28.6-31.1) (34.9-39.5) (39.2-46.9) (41.2-53) 
       
South Asia 26.5 27.8 31.0 37.0 42.8 47.8 
 (26.5-26.5) (27.5-28.2) (29.7-32.3) (34.6-39.6) (39.5-46.4) (43.1-53) 
       
China Region 31.2 35.1 40.5 47.9 50.9 51.9 
 (31.2-31.2) (34.7-35.6) (39.3-41.7) (44.7-51.3) (45.2-56.9) (44.6-60.3) 
       
Pacific Asia 28.2 30.5 34.2 39.6 43.6 48.0 
 (28.2-28.2) (30.3-30.7) (33.1-35.4) (37.1-42) (39.8-47.7) (42.6-54.4) 
       
Japan/Oceania 40.4 43.0 46.9 51.4 54.4 57.8 
 (40.4-40.4) (42.8-43.3) (45.3-48.4) (47.3-55.7) (47.4-62) (48.4-67.6) 
       
Western Europe 38.3 40.1 43.6 48.5 51.2 54.2 
 (38.3-38.3) (39.9-40.3) (42.1-44.9) (44.7-52.4) (44.8-57.7) (45.9-63.2) 
       
Eastern Europe 37.0 39.8 44.2 50.4 52.8 53.4 
 (37-37) (39.6-40.1) (42.9-45.6) (46.7-54.1) (46.4-59.8) (45.3-62.5) 
 0.000 0.004 0.024 0.058 0.101 0.129 
       
European FSU 37.2 39.7 43.8 49.2 50.3 49.4 
 (37.2-37.2) (39.5-39.9) (42.6-45.1) (45.6-52.8) (44.2-56.7) (42.5-57.8) 
       
World 29.7 31.3 34.2 38.8 42.4 46.0 
 (29.7-29.7) (31-31.5) (33.1-35.3) (36.4-41.4) (38.8-46.4) (41.1-51.4) 
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7.  New Measures of Ageing 
The future of ageing is uncertain because future trends in fertility, mortality, and 
migration are uncertain. But it is also far from certain whether our traditional measures 
of ageing are providing the best answers to the questions that we need asked. 
Traditional measures such as the proportion of the population 60+ years old and the old 
age dependency ratio assume that people 60+ are old. But a 60 year old in 1900 might 
not be functionally the same as a 60 year old in 2000. By extension, a 60 year old in 
2100 who could have a remaining life expectancy of 40 years may not be effectively as 
old as a 60 year old in 2000. Whether people are old in any meaningful way is not just a 
matter of the number of birthdays that they have experienced. In Sanderson and 
Scherbov (2005, 2006, 2007) and Lutz et al. (2008), we have presented new measures of 
ageing that take changes in life expectancy into account. We argue there that, in the 
long-run, being old is more closely related to the number of years people have left to 
live than it is to the number of years that they have currently lived. 
Reformulating the way we measure ageing to take life expectancy change into 
account is not difficult. One way is to supplement the proportion of the population 60+ 
with the proportion of the population who are in age groups where remaining life 
expectancy is 15 years or less. We call this Prop. RLE 15-. Using the average forecast, 
the region in the world with the highest proportion of people 60+ in 2050 is Japan with 
42.4 percent. In 2050, Japan is only the fourth oldest region if we consider people old 
when they get into age groups with remaining life expectancies of 15 years of less. The 
Prop. RLE 15- for Japan in 2050 is only 19.9 percent. In 2100, Japan again has the 
highest proportion of its population 60+, but it is only the third highest region when we 
measure who is old using Prop. RLE 15-. Its Prop. RLE 15- in 2100 is less than 40 
percent of its proportion 60+. Prop. RLE 15- for the world and our regions are shown in 
Table 6. 
Prop. RLE 15- is only one of three new measures of ageing that we discussed in 
Lutz et al. (2008). One new measure adjusts median ages for changes in life 
expectancies (Sanderson and Scherbov 2005) and another one computes the average 
remaining life expectancy of population members. These three new measures provide a 
complementary view of the ageing process. Whether the conventional measures or the 
new ones are preferable depends on the details of what the researcher wishes to 
accomplish. 
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Table 6.  Global and regional proportions of populations in age groups with remaining 
life expectancy of 15 years or less. Figures in the Table are means of 1,000 simulated 
futures. 
 2000 2010 2050 2100 
North Africa 5 5 10.8 15.8 
Sub Saharan Africa 4.8 4.8 5.4 13.4 
North America 11.3 9.7 13.6 15 
Latin America 5.9 5.9 11.8 14.4 
Central Asia 6.2 5.5 10.5 15.7 
Middle East 4.4 4.1 9 16.4 
South Asia 6 6.2 11.4 19.3 
China Region 7.4 8.2 20.7 22.2 
Pacific Asia 5.8 6.5 13.7 17.2 
Japan/Oceania 12.7 13.8 19.9 20.5 
Western Europe 13.4 12.8 19 19 
Eastern Europe 12.9 13 22.3 21.3 
European Former Soviet Union 14.1 13.7 22.3 19.2 
World 7.4 7.3 12 15.6 
 
8.  Conclusions 
The extent of ageing in the future is uncertain. This is for two main reasons. First, 
population age distributions are uncertain because we do not know the future paths of 
fertility, mortality, and migration. The second is because the concept of who is old itself 
is likely to change over time. The UN high, medium, and low variants do not take 
mortality uncertainty or migration uncertainty into account and they do not allow for the 
possibility that the definition of who is old could change over time. Because of these 
limitations, exclusive reliance on the UN variants can produce misleading results for 
ageing research. 
Slowly, over the course of the century, the forces driving variations in the 
conventional ageing measures will be changing. In most regions of the world, we can 
see two quite distinct phases of ageing, a more rapid period of increase in ageing 
measures in the first half of the century and then a slowdown in the pace of increase. 
When we take the uncertainty in the ageing measures into account, we see that, in some 
regions, it is even possible that those measures will be lower in 2100 than in 2050. 
There is, however, a deeper uncertainty. Conventional measures of ageing 
assume that people are categorized as “old” when they reach a certain age. But any 
fixed age, such as 60 or 65 is inappropriate when we wish to study ageing over a long 
period of time. A 60 year old might be considered elderly in 2000, but not in 2100. Two 
aspects of ageing need to be distinguished. Over time, there will be more elderly people 
in the world, but as life expectancy increases and medical care improves, older people 
of a given age will become more capable and they have longer remaining lifetimes. In 
many ways, they will act like younger people did some decades earlier. We have 
explored this issue in more detail in Sanderson and Scherbov (2005, 2007) and Lutz et 
al. (2008), where we presented measures of ageing adjusted for life expectancy change. 
In this last paper, we also considered changes in the speed of ageing. 
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In the past, demographers have had the good fortune of being able to study 
ageing using measures with fixed age boundaries. Ages around 60 and 65 coincided 
with normal pension ages and typical retirement ages. Now that normal pension ages are 
changing and we are increasingly aware that people in their early and mid-60s are not 
necessarily elderly, we are likely to need new measures of ageing, including those with 
variable age boundaries. 
It may seem that the vision that we are presenting is a complex one. Measuring 
and understanding the movements and the uncertainties involved in our conventional 
measures of ageing as well as those associated with new measures that allow the age of 
becoming elderly to vary is certainly no easy task. In our view, in the past we have been 
looking at the analogue of a black and white picture of ageing. It is more complex to 
produce and analyse a picture in colour, but it is much more informative as well. 
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Appendix 
The forecasts in this paper have resulted from updating forecasts that we previously 
published (Lutz et al. 2001a). Those forecasts, like the present ones, used 2000 as a base 
year. The updating process was a bit different for the China Region, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and South Asia than for the other regions. In all the other regions, we used 
observed values of fertility, mortality, and migration in the period from 2000 to 2005. 
For the China Region, we used observed values of mortality and migration, but there 
were no reliable fertility data to use. The population of the China Region is dominated 
by the population of China. The other countries in the region are Cambodia, Laos, 
Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam. Published total fertility rates for China in that 
period range from 1.2 to 1.8. After a careful review of 18 different estimates (Lutz et al. 
2005), we decided that the China Region’s fertility, even in 2000, was uncertain and we 
assumed a distribution of total fertility rates at that date with a mean of 1.5 and an 80 
percent uncertainty range of 1.3 to 1.7. There are reasons to suspect that there are also 
uncertainties in the starting total fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
(see for example Lutz et al. 2001b). Our fertility assumptions for selected years and 
their uncertainties are given in Appendix Table 1. Because of these baseline 
uncertainties in total fertility rates, we began our forecasts from the year 2000. 
Mean life expectancies at birth are usually assumed to increase by two years per 
decade. The uncertainties around the means are assumed to grow over time, so that there 
remains a 10 percent chance in each year that life expectancy is lower than it was at the 
beginning of the century. The mortality rates are based on those in Lutz et al. (2001a) 
updated using observations from 2000 through 2005. The earlier mortality rate 
assumptions can be found in Lutz et al. (2004: 26, Table 2.2). 
Justifications of our assumptions and a complete description of the methodology 
that we used in making the forecasts can be found in Lutz et al. (2004). 
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Appendix Table 1.  Mean total fertility rate assumptions and 80 percent probability 
intervals (in parentheses) for selected years. Sources for 2000, 2025, 2050 from Lutz et 
al. (2008: Supplementary Material, Supplementary Table 3); for 2082 from Lutz et al. 
(2004: 25, Table 2.1). Note: The year 2082 is used here because it is assumed that after 
that date the means and standard deviations of fertility rates remain constant. 
Region/Year 2000 2025 2050 2082 
North Africa 3.3 2.2 
(1.8-2.6) 
2.0 
(1.7-2.4) 
1.9 
(1.4-2.4) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.6 
(5.3-5.8) 
3.4 
(2.7-4.1) 
2.6 
(2.1-3.2) 
1.8 
(1.3-2.3) 
North America 2.0 1.9 
(1.5-2.2) 
1.9 
(1.6-2.2) 
2.0 
(1.5-2.5) 
Latin America 2.6 2.1 
(1.8-2.5) 
2.1 
(1.7-2.4) 
2.0 
(1.5-2.5) 
Central Asia 2.8 2.2 
(1.8-2.6) 
2.0 
(1.7-2.3) 
1.8 
(1.3-2.3) 
Middle East 3.7 2.2 
(1.8-2.6) 
2.0 
(1.6-2.3) 
1.8 
(1.3-2.3) 
South Asia 3.5 
(3.3-3.6) 
2.2 
(1.8-2.6) 
1.9 
(1.5-2.2) 
1.5 
(1.0-2.0) 
China Region 1.5 
(1.3-1.7) 
1.4 
(1.1-1.7) 
1.5 
(1.2-1.8) 
1.7 
(1.2-2.2) 
Pacific Asia 2.5 2.1 
(1.8-2.5) 
1.9 
(1.6-2.2) 
1.6 
(1.1-2.1) 
Japan/Oceania 1.4 1.4 
(1.1-1.8) 
1.5 
(1.2-1.8) 
1.6 
(1.1-2.1) 
Western Europe 1.7 1.5 
(1.2-1.9) 
1.6 
(1.3-2.0) 
1.7 
(1.2-2.2) 
Eastern Europe 1.4 1.4 
(1.1-1.8) 
1.6 
(1.3-2.0) 
1.7 
(1.2-2.2) 
European FSU 1.3 1.4 
(1.1-1.8) 
1.6 
(1.3-2.0) 
1.9 
(1.4-2.4) 
 
